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Introduction
The impacts of a changing climate are only beginning to become clear, but their predicted
impacts paint a picture of a troubled world, with physical changes driving millions away from
their homes, natural disasters threatening untold damage, and agricultural systems disrupted by
new temperature patterns. The effects of global climate change will be, as the term suggests,
worldwide, but some regions are less prepared or harbor larger populations in areas that will be
most drastically affected by climatic shifts, rising oceans, and agricultural disruptions.
President Obama’s fall 2011 directive to expand and intensify the U.S. military presence in the
South Asia-Pacific regions has already resulted in the reallocation of resources and personnel in
the region and will continue to remain at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy, remaining
unaffected by discussions around strategic funding cuts. As this ‘pivot’ of forces is perceived to
bolster and balance American influence against Chinese interests, it is anticipated that this focus
will continue through many future administrations.
As the United States has long been relied upon for leadership among natural disasters and tragic
events affect broad populations in the developing world, the climate-driven impacts in the South
Asia-Pacific region will be highly relevant to U.S. military strategy and activity. The following
report details the project impacts from global climate change predicted for the region the U.S.
military is currently transitioning to under the President’s order.

Findings
Climate change, a global threat, will impact some regions of the world differently than others.
Because of differences in human populations throughout these regions, these disparate impacts
will cause much more damage in both human and economic terms in the Asia-Pacific region than
in Western Europe and the Middle East. United Nations reports predict that this region could
experience temperature variations of over 3 degrees more than the Middle East.
Due to the Obama Administration’s rebalancing of U.S. military forces to the Asia-Pacific
region, the U.S. military mission will be impacted by devastating climate impacts in Southeast
Asia and on island Pacific nations predicted by the UN Environmental Program’s
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Included in these predictions are warnings of
inequity in both initial impacts of climate change and divergent abilities for countries to respond
and adapt to such impacts with disproportionate impacts on developing countries. As the AsiaPacific region is predicted to be both more harshly impacted from physical damages of climate
change and to have less capacity to adapt to changes than other regions of the world, the U.S.
military forces will have a heavy role in assisting damaged populations.
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The rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region, or ‘Pacific Pivot’, is predicted to shift 100,000
troops in surrounding countries as well as multiple Naval war ships to the South China Sea. The
predicted crisis that will be caused by climate change in the Asia-Pacific region will create a
need for American military forces to intervene and provide humanitarian relief. Both the country
and the military must prepare for this dimension of the Pacific Pivot.
In 1988, the United Nations Environmental Programme and the World Meteorological
Organization jointly formed the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to provide
scientific analysis of climate change, its impacts and strategies from adaptation. This body
assesses the work of thousands of scientists from around the world to provide a consensus
international opinion on climate change. Since its formation, the IPCC has published reports on
extreme weather behavior, regional predictions for climate impacts, adaptations needed by
changes brought on from climate change, and many more consensus documents on how climate
change will alter the physical world and what social, economic, and political impacts it will
bring. One of the trends identified in IPCC reports is that “those with the least resources have the
least capacity to adapt and are the most vulnerable.”1 Although the panel has produced evidence
of drastic changes in environments all over the globe, ability to adapt to environmental changes
varies across populations according to wealth, infrastructure, and geography. In a 2001 report,
the IPCC found that, in Asia, “adaptive capacity of human systems is low and vulnerability [to
climate impacts] is high.” More recently, the panel announced that, in the case of extreme
weather events, “fatality rates and economic losses expressed as a proportion of gross domestic
product are higher in developing countries.”2
Pronounced impacts of climate change on Asia and in developing countries at large are
significant to US foreign policy for two reasons. First of all, the United States is expected to play
an important role in leading international responses to natural disasters around the globe. The
nation’s current National Security Strategy makes a strong commitment to caring for humans
wherever there is need, specifically in the case of emerging challenges: “It would be destructive
to both American national security and global security if the United States used the emergence of
new challenges and the shortcomings of the international system as a reason to walk away.”3
This White House document makes a clear commitment to humanitarian efforts, stating that “a
changing climate portends a future in which the United States must be better prepared and
resourced to exercise robust leadership to help meet critical humanitarian needs.” Second, an
increased US military presence in highly impacted regions will necessitate leadership and agility
in the US response to climate impacts in Asia. The Defense Department’s strategic guidance
directive from January of this year calls for the United States to “expand our networks of
cooperation with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability
and capacity for securing common interests.”4 Already, at the start of this “Pacific pivot”, the
administration has deployed naval ships to the region and planned to send 2500 Marines to be
1
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stationed in Australia.5 These investments are seen as down payments for a presence that will
grow as military obligations elsewhere recede.

US Foreign Policy and the ‘Pivot’
From the conclusion of World War II to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991, American foreign
policy was clear and well-known. “The clear and present danger Soviet arms posed to the United
States during the Cold War made the development of a consensus about the need to resist the
Soviet Union relatively easy.”6 The Cold War saw a grand strategy of containment, with the
United States doing all in its economic and military power to contain communism to the
countries it currently existed in and stop its spread to other nations. This strategy was
characterized by the Marshall Plan, America’s commitment to providing resources to democratic
countries as incentive for them to stay democratic and resist communist courting. Through this
lens, foreign policy decisions were simple if not easy. America’s national security calculus
included not only protecting the physical borders and citizens of the United States, but it also
valued the protection of any democracy under threat from a communist power--specifically the
Soviet Union. Since the conclusion of the Cold War, America has wrestled with various forms of
grand strategy. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States sat atop a global structure that
it controlled by being able to fend off any foe. This “unipolar moment… began with the breakup
of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and ended with the collapse of the Lehman Brothers on
September 15, 2008” and defined America’s unmatched leadership as a stretch of time in which
“the United States had no military peer… and fought one big war in the Persian Gulf and three
lesser ones in the Balkans and Afghanistan.”7 Since the Great Recession, US GDP has fallen to
second in the world behind the European Union and threatened by the growth of China’s. This
uncertainty of the United States’ place as an unmatched global force necessitates shift in foreign
policy post-recession.
Grand strategies “lay out a vision for how American power can be used to pursue national
interests and values in a shifting global environment.”8 Since the end of the Cold War, the world
has changed in many fundamental ways. Rarely do states pose a threat to America or its global
interests. Instead, our military is left tracking and fighting non-state terrorist groups sprinkled
across the globe, free-standing from international legal requirements or limits on behavior.
Climate change brings with it shortages in natural resources that already are stirring conflicts
within and among political actors over allocation and use. With an increasingly gridlocked
political system, the need for the United States to articulate a long-term strategy to guide
priorities and decisions in Washington is nothing short of urgent. Military scholars have called
for a fundamental shift in strategy from unitary leadership to cooperative collaboration on global
5
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issues of security and peace. In “A National Strategic Narrative”, a Navy Captain and Marine
Corps Colonel call for a shift from “a strategy of containment to a strategy of sustainment; from
an emphasis on power and control to an emphasis on strength and influence; from a defensive
posture of exclusion, to a proactive posture of engagement.”9
In January of this year, President Obama announced that the United States will “focus on a
broader range of challenges and opportunities, including the security and prosperity of the Asia
Pacific.”10 An accompanying Defense Department report outlines a greater case for an American
presence in Asia:
“U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc
extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South
Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the
U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity
rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. Our relationships with Asian allies and key
partners are critical to the future stability and growth of the region. We will emphasize
our existing alliances, which provide a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security. We will
also expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the AsiaPacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests.”11
Figure 1 depicts some of the Administration’s announced plans for building up a major
American presence in the Asia-Pacific region. With nearly 100,000 ground troops, stationed
naval ships, and negotiations underway for larger presences in Australia and the Philippines, this
map portrays how populated the Southeast of the region will be with American forces. In
addition, the Defense Department has indicated that this shift will impact its force reduction
exercise, resulting in greater cuts in Army and Marine forces than from the Navy, as the Pacific
is considered a naval theater.12 The inclusion of the Pacific pivot in long-range force planning
indicates that the Asia-Pacific focus may be the closest policy produced from the Pentagon to
resemble a post-recession Grand Strategy. Given a long-term commitment to the region, it is
useful to explore the risks and predicted future of the area over the course of a U.S. rebalancing
of forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Climate Threat
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has amassed data and findings related to
climate change since 1990. Among the panel’s publications is a regional analysis of risks and
impacts from climate change, published in 1997 and updated in an

9
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Figure 1. Map of the Asia-Pacific Including Selected Troop Deployments and Plans

Congressional Research Service (2012)
expanded report in 2012. The global impacts of climate change have also been detailed in IPCC
reports and include rising ocean levels, loss of biodiversity, shifts in agricultural production,
increase in disease, increased extreme weather events, reduced fresh water supply, and human
health and justice issues related to previous impacts.13 The most applicable use of this
information, though, will be to compare the change in risks the United States faces as a result of
rebalancing forces from the Middle East and Europe to the Asia-Pacific region.
With U.S. forces recently drawn down in Iraq and currently at a high in Afghanistan, the climate
impacts for the Middle East can establish a baseline for comparison. A regional study conducted
by the IPCC in 1997 warns of increased desertification of the region, reduced wheat output in
Pakistan (a potentially unstable area) and Kazakhstan, as well as an intensification of present
environmental threats.14 For example, the area “is vulnerable to water shortages, and climate
13
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change is likely to exacerbate this problem.”15 Meanwhile, Europe boasts a high “adaptive
capacity” to climate impacts, lessening the severity of changes in weather and water levels when
compared to other regions. In fact, some areas of the continent will benefit from longer growing
seasons and be agriculturally improved by climate change.16
Comparatively, the Asia-Pacific region defined by the US Defense Department’s 2012 Strategic
Directive lies more vulnerable to climate change in a number of ways. In contrast with the
developed countries of Europe, the Asia-Pacific region is defined by high vulnerability and low
adaptive capacity to climate impacts. Further, this region is more vulnerable to extreme weather
events, including floods, droughts, forest fires, and tropical cyclones. For the same reasons that
led the Defense Department to preserve the number of ships currently in the US Navy, the region
also has lots of coasts and is therefore especially susceptible to rising sea levels. “Sea-level rise
and an increase in the intensity of tropical cyclones would displace tens of millions of people in
low-lying coastal areas of temperate and tropical Asia.”17 Disease will be particularly
problematic in Asia-Pacific as “malaria, schistosomiasis and dengue—which are significant
causes of mortality and morbidity in Tropical Asia—are very sensitive to climate and are likely
to spread into new regions on the margins of presently endemic areas as a consequence of
climate change.”18 The refugee issue caused by displacement from rising sea levels and health
risks from increased disease contraction are hardly conditions that cannot be ignored by the
wealthiest nation on Earth.
Of even greater concern than these continental disparities are the impacts upon small-island
states that populate the Southeast Asia-Pacific region. One island (Majuro atoll) would be 80%
covered by a 1 meter rise in sea level. Entire ecosystems and even full populations would be
disrupted and displaced by climate impacts. Figure 2 shows how temperature increases vary
across regions. While West Asia is predicted to experience 2-degree temperature increases in the
next 45 years and 1.5-degree increase after that, both East Asia and Australia are predicted to see
almost 5-degree warmer temperature in the short term followed by over 2-degree long term
additional increases. So far, terrorist threats are substantially reduced in the Asia-Pacific
region—compared to the Middle East, but the risks posed by climate change are substantially
greater in the Asia-Pacific region, a change which will require much planning and preparation
from the United States to assist in adaptation and reducing vulnerability to climate impacts.

15
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Figure 2. Projected Regional Temperature Changes.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2012)
These climate risks are absent from any government analysis of the pivot and will need to be
factored into future calculations. As climate impacts are better understood and the developed
world’s role in assisting those countries hit hardest by the climate of 2100 and its subsequent
woes.

The Military and Climate Change
Without regard to regional location, climate impacts will affect the United States military due to
its status as the primary responder to natural disasters across the world. In the case of past
observed disasters, “higher-category storms tend to draw military forces because of the extent of
the damage and the destruction caused to traditional infrastructure… that would support civilian
response”.19 With an increase in extreme events, this trend would predict further activity for the
US military. “Climate change is likely to cause an increase in demand for military forces in both
disaster response and humanitarian assistance operations” while at the same time “climate
change may introduce significant ‘non-linearities’ in the system of response, aid, security, and
stability, making simple projections of future requirements extremely difficult.”20
19

McGrady, Ed, Maria Kingsley, and Jessica Stewart. Climate Change: Potential Effects on Demands for US
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20
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McGrady et al found that with rising political pressure required to deploy US forces that the
military response to natural disasters has receded. Figure 3 demonstrates this decline over each
U.S. presidential term since Richard Nixon. If this trend were to continue, the Asia-Pacific
region would find itself with lots of U.S. military troops, an increasing rate of climate disasters
resulting in death and displacement for huge populations, and no help from the West due to
political obstacles. However, with the round-the-clock American media cycle of natural
disasters, domestic pressure for action may reverse this trend. In order to maintain relationships
with partner and host countries in the region, US forces will have to engage in humanitarian
activity in the region. Past instances reveal a pattern of assistance, even in non-strategic
instances. For example, the US has continually provided assistance to North Korea even though
relations between the two countries have long been sour.
Figure 3. Ratio of humanitarian responses to natural disasters.

McGrady, et al (2010)
The extreme natural disaster events projected by climate change will fundamentally change the
need for humanitarian assistance, an international need that has often been fulfilled by the US
military. Southeast Asia is particularly vulnerable to climate impacts because of its tropical
climate, populated coastlines, and dangerous diseases. With America’s recent shift to a long-term
presence in Southeast Asia, its military will need to prepare for humanitarian assistance in
climate-related events.
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